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LECTURE
From Chattel to Consenter: Adolescents
and Informed Consent
2009 Grover Powers Lecture
Angela Roddey Holder, LLM*
Professor Emerita of the Practice of Medical Ethics and Humanities, Trent Center for
Bioethics, Humanities & History of Medicine, Duke University Medical Center
Angela Holder was to give the Grover Powers Memorial Lecture at the weekly Grand
Rounds conducted by the Yale Department of Pediatrics on Wednesday, May 27, 2009, but
unfortunately, she died one month earlier, onApril 22, leaving behind her prepared address,
“From Chattel to Consenter: Adolescents and Informed Consent,” which she had regarded
as the pinnacle of a remarkable career, much of it spent at Yale.As the Grover Powers hon-
oree, the department’s highest honor, Ms. Holder was only the fourth woman of 46 recipients
and the first who was not a physician. On the date scheduled for her address, tributes were
presented by her son, John Holder, and her longtime colleague, Dr. Robert Levine, co-
founder of Yale’s Interdisciplinary Bioethics Center. Their comments followAngela Holder’s
completed but undelivered Grover Powers address. — Myron Genel, MD, Professor Emer-
itus of Pediatrics
Under the common law of England
and in the early years of the United States,
a minor (defined as anyone under 21) was
a chattel or possession of his or her father
[1-4].Afather had the right to sue a physi-
cian who treated his son or daughter per-
fectly properly but without the father’s
permission because such an intervention
contravened the father’s right to control the
child. Beginning in the early years of the
20th century, by the end of World War II
and into the 1950s, the notion that a 16-
year-old was a legally different entity from
a 6-year-old gradually became law in all
states.1 The first hospital unit for adoles-
cents was created in 1951 at Boston Chil-
dren’s Hospital, and the concept of
“adolescent medicine” was born [5].
As the law in this area currently de-
fines “adolescent,” we are discussing some-
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fessor Emeritus of Pediatrics & Senior Research Scientist, Yale Child Health Research
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1Even today, however, far fewer than a majority of pediatricians surveyed by theAAP had any idea about
the concept of assent for medical treatment or any other of the other principles stated in theAAP Consent
Guidelines. Lee KJ, Havens, Peter L, et al. Assent for Treatment: Clinician Knowledge, Attitude and
Practice. Pediatrics. 2006;118:723.one 14 or older who may be (1) living at
home with his or her parents; (2) Not living
at home but still dependent on parents (i.e.,
a 16-year-old college freshman living in a
dorm); (3) an “emancipated minor” who is
married, emancipated by a court order, or a
parent (other than in North Carolina), living
away from home and self-supporting; or (4)
a runaway or throwaway.At any time in this
country, there are about 200,000 adolescents
living on the streets with no adult supervi-
sion or involvement [6].
Regardless of the age of the patient, in-
formed consent consists of five elements:
(1)An explanation of what will happen; (2)
explanation of the risks; (3) explanation of
the projected benefits; (4) alternatives (in-
cluding doing nothing); and (5) why the
physician thinks it should be done, which I
interpret as a right to know one’s diagnosis.
While the doctrine of “therapeutic privilege”
means that in rare cases a physician may
withhold some information from an adult
patient if she or he believes the patient can-
not “deal with the information,” there can
never be any withholding of information
from an adolescent. If the patient can’t deal
with the information to be presented, then
parents have to be involved and give permis-
sion to treat the adolescent.
In some cases, when parents are in-
volved, they do not want their adolescent to
know his or her diagnosis.While this is usu-
ally not a good idea, it normally falls under
the rubric of “professional judgment,” and
the physician has every right to decide to
follow the parents’instruction if she agrees
with it. In some situations, however, the ado-
lescent must be told what his or her illness
is, whether parents like it or not. For exam-
ple, if a teenager is HIV positive, he or she
must be told, must be instructed about safe
sex, and must be asked to divulge the names
of any sex partners. Parents who say, “Oh,
no, don’t tell him, he would never do any-
thing like that, so it doesn’t matter,” should
be tactfully but firmly led to accept the fact
that he may well have and if he hasn’t yet, he
will certainly in the future.There has been at
least one successful malpractice case in
which the physician did not, at the request
of the parents, tell his adolescent patient that
he had HIV.The patient’s girlfriend caught it
and sued the physician [7]. I feel sure there
are many more cases like this that have been
quietly settled and no one will ever hear
about.
Usually, questions about adolescents
giving consent to treatments that their par-
ents don’t know about involve outpatient
treatment. In the first place, hospital admin-
istrators, who are much more interested in
getting paid than they are in advancing the
rights of autonomous adolescents, are not
going to admit for a non-emergency prob-
lem a minor whose parent has not made
some sort of financial arrangement to pay
for it. Secondly, in most households, if Little
Herman doesn’t show up for supper or
throughout the evening, someone notices
and a few telephone calls later discovers that
Little Herman is in the hospital.
SPECIAL STATUTES
All states permit minors, usually of any
age, to consent to treatment of drug or alco-
hol problems and “diagnosis and treatment”
of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs).
These statutes began in the 1960s when
teenagers with STDs were afraid to tell their
parents they needed treatment, so they didn’t
get it and, therefore, spread their diseases.
Almost all medical organizations agreed that
it was necessary to provide confidential
treatment to get the epidemic under control.
How “under control” it is depends on how
you view the fact that 12 million adolescents
in the United States today have STDs [8].
Incidentally, those politicians who are cur-
rently muttering that teenagers and young
adults are not only going to hell in hand bas-
kets but are taking the whole country with
them should check out the statistics on both
STDs and adolescent pregnancy in 1955 —
when many of these legislators were
teenagers themselves — compared to today.
The same principles applied to drug and al-
cohol problems:They would go untreated if
parents had to be informed.
The current “big issue” in informed
consent for adolescents involving STDs is
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and treatment” of STDs also cover preven-
tion; in other words, is it legally permissible
for a minor to get human papillomavirus
(HPV) vaccine without parental knowledge?
Of course, the practical difficulty is that the
series of shots costs about $320, but assum-
ing the fiscal problem is resolved, experts
still disagree on whether it is necessary to
obtain parental consent, as it clearly is with
most vaccines. For my part, I think that
when there is no clear answer to the con-
trary, good medical practice would indicate
the vaccine should be given.The majority of
my colleagues and the entire Planned Par-
enthood system disagree with my views,
however [9-11].
Federal law (Title 10 of the Public
Health Service Act of 1970) provides for
confidential provision of contraceptives to
those of any age who come to a federally
funded family planning clinic, although
from time to time various congressmen have
tried to add a provision requiring parental
notification, including the Reagan era
“squeal rule,” which was promptly declared
unconstitutional [12].
Some states have general consent
statutes that say, “Any minor of X age may
consent to medical or surgical care,” al-
though most of them have made an excep-
tion for abortion, thus creating a situation in
which a 16-year-old has the legal authority
to consent to removal of a brain tumor but
not have a first trimester abortion.
In states without consent statutes, courts
haveadoptedthe“matureminorrule,”which
basically means that if a physician believes
that the particular adolescent 14 or older un-
derstandsthesituationaswellasanadultand
cangivethesamedegreeofinformedconsent
thattheadultpatientwould,shemayproceed
to treat the minor without parental consent.
Theageandmaturityofthepatient,thenature
of the illness, and the risks of therapy are all
part of the equation. The mature minor rule
normally would apply only to therapies that
do not involve serious risks and does not, at
this time, ever apply to investigational drugs
[13].A14-year-old might very well come to
anadolescentclinicandgiveconsenttobeing
treatedforasorethroat;however,Idoubtany
pediatric oncologist would consider treating
the same adolescent for leukemia without
parental involvement.
Incidentally, for those of you who have
to make a living, if parents do not consent to
non-emergency diagnosis or treatment, they
do not have to pay for it.
ABORTION
The continuing legislative battles in the
field of adolescent medicine are abstinence-
only education and abortion. There are many
legislators, both state and federal, who would
liketobanishabortionfromU.S.law,whether
the pregnant woman is 14 or 24, but they
knowthereisverylittletheycandotoprevent
adult women from making this choice.
Among these are those legislators, state and
federal, who are convinced that no one of the
female persuasion has enough sense to make
up her own mind about anything, including
her own body, and don’t think women have
any business being doctors, lawyers, Episco-
pal bishops, generals, admirals, or any other
professional who might give orders to those
ofthemalepersuasion.Thatgrouptendstobe
hopelessly uneducable, but some other legis-
latorscandiscussthesemattersrationally,and
I urge all of you to engage them in discussion
whenever possible.
First, if the theory of abstinence-only
education were correct — that if teenagers
hear something in school, they will rush
right out and do it (or not do it, if Teacher
told them not to) — graffiti would consist of
algebraic equations. After all, they learn
graffiti art at the same time they learn absti-
nence-only sex education. I haven’t seen any
quadratic equations on the sides of build-
ings. In practice, abstinence-only education
is clearly not achieving its goal. According
to the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC), a third of U.S. girls are sex-
ually active by 15, and 21 percent of
ninth-grade girls have had sex with four or
more partners.
The theory behind the minor abortion
statutes in almost every state (Connecticut
excepted) is that the girl is too “immature”
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issue; thus, her parent should consent or, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, she may go to
court to get permission. While judges in
somestates,suchasMassachusetts,routinely
grant permission, there are states, particu-
larly Alabama, in which some judges have
never given permission for any girl, no mat-
ter how near 18 she may be.What has never,
apparently, occurred to these judges is that if
the girl doesn’t have an abortion, she will
haveababy,andifsheistooimmaturetode-
cidetoabort,whatsortofmothercanshebe?
This is particularly true when you remember
that her parents (except in North Carolina)
have absolutely no duties to care for or sup-
port her baby, and since by the act of giving
birthshehasbecomeemancipated,theyhave
no further duty to her, either. So even if she
is13,herparentshavenofurtherdutytofeed
or house her, much less her baby.
While there are very few cases in which
a parent wanted a girl to have an abortion
and the girl wanted to continue the preg-
nancy, the courts so far have all held that the
girl’s wishes would prevail.We have no way
to know how many situations like this never
go to court, the girl has the abortion, and she
has had no advice from anyone that she has
the right to object. In one case from Texas
[14], a woman found out years after the sur-
gery that the “operation” she had at 16 was
an abortion at her mother’s request when the
doctor told her mother (but not her) that she
was pregnant.When she sued, the court held
that she had no cause of action because her
mother, not she, had the right to give in-
formed consent. I suspect there are more sit-
uations like that than anyone will ever be
able to document.
The “immaturity” alleged in girls’ in-
abilities to make abortion decisions contrasts
remarkably with other accepted legal stan-
dards. For example, while a 14-year-old girl
is “too immature” to decide about abortion,
if she murders someone, she can be tried as
an adult and sentenced to life in adult prison.
Until the Supreme Court recently ruled
against it, in many states she could have
been executed. Immaturity is not a defense
to any criminal charge. A recent article dis-
cusses a Pennsylvania case in which two 12-
year-old girls were awaiting trial for homi-
cide in an adult court [15].A17-year-old girl
can fight in Afghanistan but cannot come
home and have an abortion (or, for that mat-
ter, legally buy a beer.)
The right to refuse treatment is far more
complex for an adolescent than it is for an
adult. If an adolescent is capable of consent-
ing to a treatment, he or she is usually capa-
ble of refusing it. Adults may refuse any
treatment they choose, even if they will die
without it; adolescents usually may not. If a
parent wishes an adolescent to have an en-
tirely elective procedure (such as plastic sur-
gery) the adolescent has every right to
refuse. If an ill adolescent is invited to par-
ticipate in an investigational drug trial, as
long as there is an alternative therapy, he or
she may refuse to assent, but if there is no
effective alternative and his or her parents
have given permission, the teenager may not
refuse. If the adolescent can find another
physician (not any other sort of health care
provider such as a chiropractor) who is will-
ing to accept the adolescent as a patient and
treat him or her as the patient wishes, the
original physicians and the parents probably
(but not certainly) could not get a court order
requiring the teenager to be treated by the
first physician.
In general, minors (up to their 18th
birthday) have no right in principle to refuse
life-saving treatment, but judges confronted
with individual cases have found that if the
minor involved was mature, understood the
permanency of death, could articulate the
reasons for wishing to stop treatment (usu-
ally a Jehovah’sWitness being kept alive by
transfusions), and was not unduly influenced
by his or her parents’ religious views, they
would order the treatment to which the
minor objected be stopped [16]. In other
states, however, on apparently similar facts,
courts have held that no minor may refuse
life-saving treatment [17].
In no state may a minor execute a living
will. Of course there are many instances,
particularly in pediatric oncology, where the
physician, the patient, and the parents agree
to let the teen “go in peace,” stop active ther-
38 Holder: From chattel to consenterapies and turn to hospice care, but if the teen
is the only one who wishes to do so, he or
she is likely to get treatment he doesn’t
want. In that situation, many parents want to
try “one more thing,” but the physician who
understands the patient’s feelings and agrees
with them is obligated to try to talk the par-
ents into agreement. If unsuccessful, how-
ever, the physician either has to persist with
the therapy or get a court order to stop it.
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REFLECTIONS
By John Thomas Roddey Holder
After beginning her career as a practic-
ing attorney and then teaching at the under-
graduate level,Angela Holder came toYale,
expecting to stay a year, in 1974. She left in
2001. My mother had a long and varied ca-
reer, but she spent more than half of it here,
at the Yale University School of Medicine.
She loved it here. She loved her students,
friends, colleagues, and the work. She en-
joyed all of the pleasures of being an aca-
demic practitioner. She taught more than
two decades of classes of future physicians
about caring for their patients in ways that
had nothing to do with the patients’medical
conditions. She earned many honors in her
career, but one of those that meant the most
to her was being selected by the medical
school’s Class of 1988 as its Commence-
ment speaker. Having her students express
their appreciation to her for being a good
teacher was more important than any other
professional honor.
She made a significant contribution to
the emerging field of law and medicine in a
way that directly affected countless lives.
That was very important to her, and she was
deeply grateful toYale for giving her the op-
portunity. I knew quite a bit about her work
and that she’d made a major impact on her
field, but since her death last month, I’ve
learned even more. I’ve heard from more
than 100 people at Yale and around the
world who have told me just how much of
an impact she had. Her colleagues have ex-
pressed their appreciation for her work and
their love of her personality. Her former stu-
dents have told me how much she influ-
enced them, as doctors and lawyers and as
people. They’ve remembered her intellect,
her thoughtfulness, her compassion, her
sense of humor, her stories, and the Southern
accent that her 27 years in New Haven could
not begin to take away.
As you know, she was supposed to have
been here today. She was deeply honored to
have been selected as the Grover Powers
Lecturer for 2009. Despite her failing health
in the last few months, she completed the
39 Holder: From chattel to consenterpresentation that she was to give here, and
she made her travel plans. The goal of mak-
ingthistripanddeliveringthislecturehelped
get her through her last round of treatment,
and the realization that she wasn’t going to
be able to make it back to New Haven was a
crushing blow to her, even before the news
got worse. But I’m deeply grateful to the
School of Medicine for setting aside someof
the time that she would have spent with you
todaytorecognizeandrememberherandthe
contribution that she made here for many
years. Thank you very much.
IN MEMORIAM
By Robert J. Levine, MD, Senior Fellow,
Interdisciplinary Bioethics Center, Pro-
fessor of Internal Medicine, Lecturer in
Pharmacology, Yale University
I knew Angela Holder and her family
well, and I am grateful to the Department of
Pediatrics for this opportunity to contribute
to our memory of this remarkable woman.
Angela Holder was a major figure in the
life of theYale Medical School for a quarter
of a century.Angela arrived atYale in 1974,
enrolled in the Yale Law School as a candi-
date for the LLM degree. She left in 2001 to
join the faculty of the Center for Bioethics in
the Duke University School of Medicine.
Shortly after her arrival at Yale, I was
asked by the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomed-
ical and Behavioral Research to interview
her. They were considering appointing her
to the staff of this commission. I began the
task of interviewing with considerable skep-
ticism. This tiny woman with her laid-back
style and her Deputy Dog accent did not
conform to what was then my image of a
lawyer. I was astonished by her broad range
of knowledge and her ability to put legal
thought in very simple terms — language
that was easily accessible to a lay person.
Her energy was astounding. I recall stating
in my report that if she did only the things
that I knew about, there was no way that she
could have slept more than two hours each
night.
She did not take the position with the
National Commission.
Soon after the interview I saw to it that
she was appointed to every relevant commit-
tee atYale for which I was responsible, most
notably the Human Investigation Committee
and the Committee on Do Not Resuscitate
Decisions that wrote the hospital’s policy on
end-of-life decisions. In these roles she was
a most lively, provocative, and constructive
participant. She usually took her positions in
very vivid and unambiguous terms.Atypical
statement: “This is the most egregious af-
front to human rights that I have ever seen.”
New colleagues — inexperienced with her
— were often infuriated with her opening
statements on issues and then astonished by
her willingness to participate in the forma-
tion of compromises that facilitated effective
action.
There are so many memorable
Holderisms. During our debate on whether
we should approve a proposal to store ex-
cess numbers of human embryos acquired
during in vitro fertilization, we were en-
gaged in a discussion of the risks. Angela
asked, “Won’t they get freezer burn? If my
lamb chops get freezer burn, why won’t the
embryos?”
In 1977, Angela was recruited to join
the medical center staff full time. She was
first appointed director of the Office for
Medico-Legal Affairs. From there, she
moved on to working at the medical school
as a teacher and researcher.
As a teacher, she was a great favorite
with the students. Her informal style in-
cluded many stories about a hypothetical pa-
tient, a child named Little Herman.
“Suppose,” she’d ask the class, “Mama
brings Little Herman to your office with the
following problem. What would you do?”
In her Grover Powers lecture, Angela
says, “Usually, questions about adolescents
giving consent to treatments that their par-
ents don’t know about involve outpatient
treatment. In the first place, hospital admin-
istrators, who are much more interested in
getting paid than they are in advancing the
autonomy rights of adolescents, are not
going to admit for a non-emergency prob-
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some sort of financial arrangement to pay
for it. Secondly, in most households, if Little
Herman doesn’t show up for supper or
throughout the evening, someone notices
and a few telephone calls later discovers that
Little Herman is in the hospital.”
One day I walked into her office while
she was talking on the phone. I heard her
say, “Doctor, it is always better to kill pa-
tients than to maim them.” I asked her what
she meant by saying such an outlandish
thing. She explained that in malpractice
cases, the judgments are always higher if the
injured party survives because there are
added expenses for lifelong medical care,
support of a disabled person, etc.
She held multiple positions of respon-
sibility in the medical school and also had
considerable recognition outside the institu-
tion. She was, for example, president of the
American Society for Law, Medicine and
Ethics, a member of the Executive Commit-
tee of the Educational Commission for For-
eign Medical Graduates, and a member of
the Executive Committee of Planned Parent-
hood of Connecticut. She was also a mem-
ber of the Board of Directors of the
American Board of Pediatrics.
She was the author of three important
books, each of which has appeared in multi-
pleeditions:TheMeaningoftheConstitution;
Medical Malpractice Law; and Legal Issues
in Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine.
Altogether, Angela lived a most won-
derful and productive life. How fortunate we
are that she chose to spend so much of it
here with us.
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